Chapter 3: Radio as Collective Improvisation

Collective Improvisation as Crisis Response

“What do you think the most important skill for a radio personality to have is?”

“Huh? Articulation or volume control, I guess?”

“That applies to any job that involves voice. For personalities, what’s most crucial is responsiveness.”

“Responsiveness?”

“For example, if you mess up on the air and delay in putting on the next song. Or if the show starts and the guest you had lined up hasn’t showed up for whatever reason. In those kinds of situations, you can panic and say something like, ‘huh? That’s odd. Just a moment please,’ or go with something like, ‘y’know, that last song reminded me. Last night, when I was washing my bra in the tub…’ and fill the time with whatever you can think of. That responsiveness is what best tests a radio personality’s skill.”

“What the hell kinda song is that?”

—Matō Kanetsugu and Koda Minare, Nami yo Kiitekure (Wave, Listen to Me!) chapter 18, “It’s My Duty,” 2020

After her second program, Nami yo Kiitekure protagonist Koda Minare goes to producer Matō Kanetsugu and, citing the minimal scripts she has received, accuses the program’s writer of intentional sabotage. “My parts of the script are half blank,” she says, “and the story is always so slapdash” (Samura 2020b). In an attempt to clarify the writer’s reasoning, Matō explains to Minare the importance for radio hosts of being able to respond immediately to any unexpected situation. As unlikely or extreme as some of his examples are, Matō’s explanation in the above epigraph effectively points to radio programmers’ presumed ability and arguably their duty to react quickly to change, whether on a small scale—music failing to load, losing track of scheduled announcements—or on a much larger scale.

In my time at WFHB, never has there been change on a larger and more immediately impactful scale than in early 2020, when a new and highly communicable strain of coronavirus emerged, causing the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States were recorded in late January; the first deaths would take place in February, though most were only officially confirmed months later. Political and social responses varied widely. At the end of March, an article in the Guardian critiqued the U.S. response in no uncertain terms; in the pandemic’s first three months, it read, the Donald Trump-led federal government “dithered and procrastinated, became mired in chaos and confusion, was distracted by the individual whims of its leader, and is now confronted by a health emergency of daunting proportions” (Pilkington and McCarthy 2020). The Associated Press concurred, noting that while the U.S. government was as aware of the disease’s virulence as any other nation in early January, the public response on a national level was virtually nonexistent until economic pressures threatened the standing regime:

Life-saving medical equipment was not stockpiled. Travel largely continued unabated. Vital public health data from China was not provided or was deemed untrustworthy. A White House riven by rivalries and turnover was slow to act. Urgent warnings were ignored by a president consumed by his impeachment trial and intent on protecting a robust economy that he viewed as central to his reelection chances… The president had firmly linked his fate to Wall Street, and it took a tumble by the markets to ratchet up his response. (Lemire et al., 2020)

Even with this, little aid came from the highest levels of government. In a March 16 conference call between the sitting president and a group of state governors, as reported by The New York Times, Trump’s advice put the onus for any practical action firmly on the state level, apparently for the sake of efficiency: “Respirators, ventilators, all of the equipment—try getting it yourselves… We will be backing you, but try getting it yourselves. Point of sales, much better, much more direct if you can get it yourself” (in Martin 2020). This laissez-faire recommendation sparked shock for some and outrage for many; Pilkington and McCarthy described it as “one of the most revelatory moments of the history of coronavirus” (2020). Amid this lack of federal aid, constantly changing information yielding constantly shifting guidelines, and the impact of widespread conspiracy theories, the U.S. death toll from COVID-19 quickly climbed to become the highest worldwide. Psychologist Karen M. Douglas observes that “people with an individualist (vs. collectivist) cultural orientation displayed lower intentions to engage in COVID-19 preventative behaviors” (2021). In the United States, this was clear from the top down.